DAOs have had almost a decade of history, during which there have been very few retrospective reviews of DAO treasury spend. This proposal aims to bring more accountability to the DAO’s spending, developing clear and measurable datapoints that the DAO can use to continue to build its processes and decision making mechanisms.

This temp check proposes undertaking a formalised retrospective on ENS DAO; its impact, its spending, its goals and its outputs from the past two years. Examining grants, DAO service providers, DAO working groups and any other output from the DAO treasury.

This retro was initially an output of conversations at Edge City with Arnold and myself exploring d/acc ideas on DAO evolution. ENS DAO is the golden example of how projects can actively expand output, community, contribution and opportunity by operating as a DAO - however, this doesn’t mean that we shouldn’t look within to improve our processes and operations. To maintain this industry leadership, ENS must be willing to self examine our goals, structure, spending and output in an honest and encouraging way.

This idea was then shared to a telegram group including working group stewards, ENS labs and clowes.eth because of how This post sparked initial thinking about more retrospective analysis of the DAOs outputs. This was then discussed during ENS & Governance events at Devconnect, and most recently the pre-proposal has been introduced to Metagov.org and Eugene who (as this proposal will outline) will ideally play the role of a data-backed, independent actor, motivated by increasing the rigor and efficacy of DAOs more broadly.

The retro will build upon the existing reporting structures developed across service providers and working groups (such as the quarterly updates from both, shoutout to Limes for these excellent WG spending summaries).

ENS DAO has grown significantly since its launch in 2021, supported by a wide range of contributors, funded initiatives, working groups, and service providers. While the high-level success of ENS is objective and clear, the DAO lacks some elements of structure and accountability. DAOs have already made immense impact on the growth and opportunity within Ethereum and we see this proposal as a way to continue improving these structures. The motivation of this proposal is to examine ENS DAO’s purpose, practices, desired outcomes, spending, outputs, and outcomes.

• What has been funded - What has not
• What has been delivered - What has not
• Tracking outputs from the ENS DAO as well as what impact do we think will be generated over a longer timeline (in as measurable ways as possible, as well as anecdotally where possible). - What outputs have not been tracked/considered
• What was considered to be reported on, what hasn’t, understanding previous reporting standards.
• What goals does the DAO have implicit and explicit - Are they only outlined in the constitution or do specific programs have specific goals?
• What are ways in which the DAO can be more rigorous and more easily held accountable?
• ENS DAO Stakeholder analysis that would use a combination of surveys and interviews to better understand the desired outcomes of the DAO, as well as the challenges it faces.

After speaking with a number of delegates, stewards and other contributors, we believe that a retrospective is the most high impact action that we can take as a DAO. Below is a synopsis of the conversations that lead us to this position:

• ENS DAO is one of the strongest DAOs in the ecosystem; establishing more formal accountability standards further strengthens our position. Very few DAOs in history have conducted this type of activity, and this will continue ENS’ position as a clear industry leader.
• Agreement that the SPP decision/vote structure needs improvement and that without conducting a retrospective on the decisions made to date it’s difficult to recommend a new path forward.
• Working groups were an output from initial ideation around the DAO. Understanding their goals, output and processes is a perfect first step before executing any specific next step. This type of retro mirrors reporting norms expected from comparable scale traditional organisations, foundations, and public companies.
• Building structured evaluation into DAO operations improves signal for delegates and DAO contributors making DAO decisions.
• This sets a precedent around transparent DAO accountability.

We envision this process taking no more than 4 months, with the aim of having it completed by the start of March before the SPP vote.

The ENS DAO Retro & Stakeholder Analysis would be fully conducted by Eugene and Metagov.org as an independent party. Contributions and data provision can be provided by anyone (in or outside of the DAO) however the data collection and analysis will be managed independently by Metagov.org, to ensure that no internal DAO politics, or external parties acting in their own best interest, blur the intent or output of the retrospective.

Another area for immediate feedback is the methods in which ENS stakeholders can contribute to this project. Community members will be encouraged to provide all relevant data and reports, which will be publicly tracked. There will also be a surveys and interviews meant to gather more qualitative information, ranging from people’s understanding of the mission, to outlining potential challenges or problems the DAO needs to solve.

It is important to remind readers - the goal of this project is not produce a proposal of what ENS DAO does next. This retrospective and stakeholder analysis is meant to provide clarity on where the DAO is and what are the some the challenges it is facing. From there, the community will use this information to inform subsequent proposals on where to take ENS DAO in Q2 of 2026 and beyond.

To ensure this retrospective informs the next SPP and WG cycles, this proposal also seeks to ratify the extension of Working Group Steward terms by up to 4 months, moving elections to ~March 2026.

We understand that a term extension without explicit opt in from WG stewards may incur some downstream effects as some WG stewards may have other commitments or already have made a decision about running in the next election. However this proposal would posit that by extending stewards term we encourage a minimum level of commitment in the retrospective where stewards have to opt out rather than opt in. This proposal would also extend the ongoing distributions to stewards to maintain their payment over this period.

If any steward wants to opt out and is not willing to continue to participate as a steward (or separately from the retro), then as long as one WG lead stays on the working group can be maintained over this extension (likely with an understood reduced output level, along with hopeful participation in the retro).

If a working group has all three stewards that are unwilling to participate in the term extension, this proposal would initially propose their WG would be ‘paused’ until the end of the extension and their multisig funds would be returned to the DAO.

On top of the reality that these stewards have insight to bring, because of these retro discussions over the past ~4 weeks (which I will directly take responsibility for alongside the MetaGov WG) there hasn’t been an announcement or any space for new possible electorates to propose themselves, which is another reason to extend these elections so we can have more time to invite wider contributors to the working groups.

As a part of this proposal it was considered to enable WG elections during the retro (over coming weeks), since extending working groups in this way disrupts the current structure that serves the DAO and community. However after consideration, keeping the current working group stewards by extending the current term for up to 4 months gives the retro the highest likelihood of engagement and ease.

As outlined below in the specification section, this snapshot vote (and previous forum post) is only an initial signal about whether the DAO retro and stakeholder analysis should go ahead. Specific deliverables, proposal scope and budget breakdown will be presented by Metagov.org as a part of the discussion between the snapshot vote and executable proposal, though as an initial estimate it’s envisioned that this budget will be ~$125k +/- $25k.

This budget could be managed by a range of actors; the MetaGov Working group, ENS Labs or Metagov.org themselves. This budget would also be tied to deliverables, timeline and scope defined by Metagov.org in the subsequent proposal.

This proposal is an initial temp check that is the first step in a multi-step process towards this retrospective:

• This proposal will be posted on snapshot to signal from the DAO that this proposal and retrospective is a worthwhile exercise. (This week)
• After a successful snapshot vote, this proposal will be further refined by Metagov.org to give a clearer scope of work around deliverables, budget breakdowns and clear goals & outputs of a DAO retrospective. (~one week)
• ENS Working Group elections would be paused following this snapshot proposal until (at minimum) the following onchain proposal ratifies this proposal.
• A ratifying onchain vote would occur that would enact this proposal, kick off the retro, extend working group terms, distribute the retro budget and empower Metagov.org as the independent party of the initiative. (By December 17th)
• Work will commence immediately, accounting for time off during public holidays, with rolling updates shared on the forum.

This proposal affects Working Group elections and is utilising Working Group rule 12.1 around Working Group Amendments.

• This proposal directly affects Working group rule 3.2 around term time limits and Working group rule 6. around delaying steward elections, by proposing an extension to the current Working Groups stewards term (as well as their compensation) and delaying the Steward elections window until either: - This proposal has an onchain ratifying vote that extends WG terms and pushes the next election window until March after the ENS retrospective. - This snapshot proposal doesn’t pass, triggering a start to the elections whenever viable: - Triggering Working Group rule 6.1, where steward elections will take place “as soon as is practicable after the missed Nomination Window or missed Election Window.” CC the post from Metagov Working group here.
• If two or more WG stewards are no longer willing to continue in their positions, funds from that multisig will be returned to the DAO treasury, in line with the bylaws.
• If one WG steward is no longer willing to hold their multi-sig position, the Metagovernance working group will decide on multi-sig governance or funds being returned to the DAO.

This retrospective is an opportunity to elevate global DAO governance standards, reinforce accountability, and continue to set ENS up for long-term success. By conducting this retrospective now and aligning upcoming governance cycles to incorporate its findings, the DAO strengthens its ability to deploy resources efficiently and transparently.